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This paper tackles the reality of academy players in the context of the international football 
world. A set of behavioral and non-behavior phenomena are studied to understand if clubs are 
biased towards buying players in the market rather than betting in their own players. A 
mathematical analysis is conducted to analyze both the non-academy and academy player’s 
variation of the market value in a window of 1 year and conclude if indeed there is an 
underestimation towards academy players. This paper allows for a financial study on football 
players valuation in a short-term window of time and the consequent return to clubs. 
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Rational expectations and market efficiency are two essential pillars in neoclassical economics. 
First, by the theory of rational behavior people are expected to act rationally in the process of 
their economic decisions. Second, consumer perceptions of a certain product are expected to 
affect its price and demand, which along with competition lead, ultimately, to an efficient 
allocation of resources within the economy, creating the market equilibrium. In short, people 
are expected to make unbiased predictions and the market incorporates them into unbiased 
estimates with useful value. 
In this paper we tackle these two building blocks of modern economics in a different but 
stimulating way: the European football context, particularly the choices of European clubs 
between their academy players and buying new players. Implicitly, teams that choose to invest 
in a new player rather than just promoting an academy player to his place are predicting that 
the first one will bring greater benefits than the latter.  
What drives a team to buy a player instead of betting on a youngster from its own academy? 
Do teams, nowadays, have a significant bias towards buying players, throwing their own 
products to second plan? In this paper, we investigate deeply what drives teams to choose one 
way over the other and what are the results of this choice. The paper’s initial conjecture is that 
teams do not have rational expectations when predicting future performance between academy 
and non-academy players. 
It seems that teams incur in a combination of behavioral and non-behavioral phenomena that 
work towards a systematic bias: teams overestimate non-academy player performance in a way 
that is inconsistent with rational expectations. A combination of known behavioral episodes 
appear to open roads where teams underestimate the return academy players can provide to the 
club both in terms of performance and financials. It was considered that this phenomenon would 
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not be eliminated by market forces because, even if there are some smart teams that do not 
follow this pattern, they are just outliers in a trend with hundreds of clubs. Hence, these few 
teams do not hold the power to change the status-quo. 
In this paper it was concluded that academy players have a greater percentual change, in one 
year, in their market value compared to non-academy players. From this follows that teams 
wanting short-term financial results are better off by betting in their academy players rather 
than searching the market for new players with the same expected quality. Meaning that, clubs 
have a higher financial return from their academy players due to the increased variation of their 
market value in the same window of time as other players. As the horizon of time is equal 
between these two classes of players (1-year window) one can only conclude that, in the short-
term, teams ought to bet in their academy to achieve increased financial results. 
Literature Review 
The transfer market implicates two processes which have constantly been under spotlights in 
the psychology field – predicting the future and bidding competitively. Psychological 
researchers have provided a span of fundamental studies on these two tasks which will be the 
roots of this paper. Even though we cannot be certain that any of these biases are to be blamed 
for the decision making, surely, they invigorate the central prediction: teams overvalue players 
in the transfer market over academy players. 
In the psychological field, overconfidence is a concept that goes hand in hand with the process 
of predicting the future. This effect is a well-known bias where a person’s confidence in his 
judgements is greater than the objective certainty of those same judgements. Meaning that, in 
the football world, coaches and scouts believe their sporting knowledge is more precise than it 
is in fact. Following Don Moore & Paul Healy’s paper in 2008 on overconfidence, this idea can 
be separated into 3 pillars: overestimation, overplacement and overprecision. The first variety 
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can be thought as an overestimation of a person’s actual ability, performance, or level of control. 
For example, a student incurs in overestimation when, in a 10-question quiz, he believes he has 
5 correct when in fact he only answered correctly in 3 of them. The second definition occurs 
when people think of themselves as better than the median. If a student thinks his score is the 
best in class when, truly, half of the class scored above him, he is overplacing his score relative 
to others. Lastly, overprecision can be described as “excessive certainty regarding the accuracy 
of one’s beliefs”. Researchers have been thoroughly studying this concept using numerical 
questions (e.g. “How long is the Nile River?”) and asking individuals to project 90% confidence 
intervals. Results demonstrate that these intervals are often too narrow, meaning that 
participants are too convinced they know the precise answer. These 90% confidence intervals 
embody the correct answer less than 50% of the time (Alpert & Raiffa, 1982; Klayman, Soll, 
Gonzalez-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; Soll & Klayman, 2004). This shows that people are not 
recognizing the limits of their cognitive capabilities nor applying sufficient weight to the 
world’s uncertainty.  
For the purpose of this paper it is also essential to understand how individual’s confidence 
varies with the amount of information available. Rationally one can deduce that confidence in 
the decision-making process will increase when people are provided with more information, 
however, frequently, this confidence increases more than the actual capacity of predicting the 
future. Stuart Oskamp (1965) studied this phenomenon through an experience whereas 
participants analyze information about a case “(a) their confidence about the case increases 
markedly and steadily but (b) the accuracy of their conclusions about the case quickly reaches 
a ceiling”. The trial was divided into 4 sections and after judges read each one of the sections, 
they had to answer a set of 25 questions about the case. Throughout the 4 stages of the study, 
the accuracy of the participant’s answers maintained rather constant, but confidence rose 
steeply with the increase of information, supporting the initial hypothesis of the paper. 
6 
 
Accordingly, individuals shifted from being reasonable in the beginning to being highly 
overconfident in the presence of more information. 
In the context of international football, clubs experience similar situations to Stuart Oskamp’s 
experiment. Consistently teams must evaluate players while increasing the amount of 
information about them. Clubs often follow players from a young age, increasing drastically 
the available information when they reach the professional or international level. When coaches 
and scouts actively target a player, additional observations are conducted to present a thorough 
report on the strengths and weaknesses of the athlete along with the possible benefits for the 
club if they sign the player. Although one may think that such reports improve club’s decisions 
about players, the previous research points the other way. On the contrary, in the face of 
complete information on players, a team’s confidence on their capacity to differentiate between 
athletes may surpass any true upgrade in their judgements. 
Competitive bidding brings another set of topics into the picture. As Thaler explains in his 1988 
paper when many players compete for a product with a common but uncertain value, the winner 
of the auction often overpays. This phenomenon is the well-known winner’s curse, “first 
discussed in the literature by three Atlantic Richfield engineers, Capen, Clapp, and Campbell 
(1971)” on oil-lease bids (Richard H. Thaler, 1988). As the author points, avoiding this 
phenomenon is not easy, even in the case where bidders have unbiased expectations of the 
product’s value, the winner of the auction is very probable to be a player who has overestimated 
the true worth of the item. If teams were to be rational during the bidding process, they would 
reduce their bids, especially when the number of clubs in the auction increases, eliminating the 
winner’s curse anomaly. However, as reported by Kagel & Levin in 1986, “Auctions with large 
numbers of bidders produce more aggressive bidding than with small numbers, resulting in 
negative profits, the winner's curse”. Thus, clubs often tend to facilitate this phenomenon when 
a large number of teams are in the race for a player, causing an overvaluation of the athlete. 
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Consequently, the winner team overpays for the athlete and gains a smaller profit than expected 
or, in sometimes, it even incurs in a negative profit. Following this line of thought it is easy to 
understand that, systematically, teams overpay for players in the transfer market when, if they 
were to be rational, it would be more profitable to bet on an academy player with the same 
expected quality. Betting on the academy does not involve any kind of bidding process with 
other clubs and, furthermore, with the lower wages and familiarity to the club of academy 
players, teams end up saving valuable money.  
Richard Thaler discusses in his 2015 book “Misbehaving” the bias known as the weight of the 
present and how this concept affects the task of teams competitive bidding. This idea suggests 
that owners, managers and coaches of a club feel the urge to win now. Therefore, when bidding 
against other teams in the transfer market there is the illusion that the desired player will turn a 
losing team into a winning team. It is of the utmost importance to note that this phenomenon 
leads clubs searching the market for players. As academy players are still young athletes, the 
structure of the club feels that these athletes do not have the capacity to change the present 
situation right now. In their eyes the best solution is to find desired players in the market and 
guarantee their signings hoping they can turn the situation around. Ultimately, the weight of the 
present undermines a club’s confidence in their academy products. 
Together, all these biases lead teams towards undervaluing academy players. These phenomena 
are the foundations to a story where clubs are blindly used to shop in the market to solve their 
problems instead of betting in their own products. Rationally, there are powerful incentives for 
clubs to overcome these biases and football has been around for long enough to have valuable 
market information that clubs have had time to study and learn the consequent lessons. It is 
fundamental to understand that sports are one of the few industries where employers can easily 
monitor the performance of candidates who were hired but also the ones that could not get the 
job. For example, every club in the world observed Renato Sanches’s failure in Munich after 
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the 2016 Euro, not only Bayern. This is just one between thousands of available examples for 
clubs which should, in theory, facilitate learning. 
However, there are also non-behavior explanations to justify the fact that teams prefer to buy 
new players instead of promoting their own young players. Corruption seems to have a 
significant role in today’s football world, and it shows no signs of slowing down. Today’s 
transfer market consists in deals between player’s agents and club executives which are 
ultimately crooked and made under a “culture of corruption” that regulatory bodies seem to 
look away from. The football’s transfer market allows for corruption by placing agents in a 
position which provides them with too much power (Michael J. Weir, 2007). Agents take 
advantage of this positioning and often bribe club executives to buy or sell players damaging 
the entire transfer system. Hence, clubs across the world are indeed biased towards buying 
players because it is in their executive’s best interest to do so. Managers that run clubs act 
against their own organization and put their personal interests in front of the team’s 
sustainability. What is alarming about this reality is that it seems to be reinforced every year 
and it is becoming part of our sports culture. For example, one can just look at the empire 
created by Jorge Mendes (Gestifute) and see the dimension of this actuality. Clubs like 
Wolverhampton, Benfica or Atletico Madrid too often negotiate players with a hand of Mendes 
present, and these are dangerous paths for football to go through. 
The Football Transfer Market 
Carmichael & Thomas (1993) divide a formal transfer market into two pillars: “ (1) to facilitate 
and organize the acquisition and exchange of players by clubs to enable the reconstitution of 
teams with the aim of increasing player strengths and improving team performance; (2) to 
facilitate the movement of players between clubs in their search for better opportunities, higher 
earnings or increased job satisfaction”. Of course, all sporting transfer markets have a set of 
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restrictions and regulations through which clubs and players guide their actions. Normally, 
these controls prevent players from moving to new clubs without the approval of their current 
team and the obligation for all transfers to be inside the respective regulatory body’s guidelines. 
Withal, the controls imposed in these markets differ between sports.  
For the purpose of this paper it is necessary to explain how the football labor market, meaning 
the transfer market, works. The most notable difference to “usual” labor markets is that in the 
football market, players cannot resign their jobs with the same ease as a regular worker in a 
company. The transfer market has made fundamental changes towards a world where players 
experience greater freedom and power. Peter J. Sloane (1969) compares the pre-1961 market 
to a slave market because players had a maximum wage and unless a club allowed to sell an 
athlete, they were “trapped” in the team as long as the owners wanted (Retain and Transfer 
System). Afterwards, in 1961 the maximum wage was eradicated and the retain and transfer 
system was altered in 1963, however a transfer fee was still necessary if the club so decided. 
This system prevented significant differences between clubs, meaning that, it did not allow a 
considerable concentration of high-quality players in few teams. If bigger teams desired star 
players, a transfer fee (monetary compensation) was demanded by smaller clubs. Accordingly, 
this incentivized teams to develop in-house players due to the compensations for their 
investments.  
However, the football transfer market would suffer key changes with the Bosman ruling, ending 
the controversial retain and transfer system. This decision turned, formally, football into an 
economic activity, hence, being subject to the provisions of the treaty of Rome regarding the 
freedom of movement of the players. Meaning that, this ruling now gives players whose 
contracts are expired the right to seek employment in any club desired, without the former club 
receiving any monetary compensation for the departure. As previously explained, this did not 
happen before the Bosman case as clubs would still receive financial compensation for out of 
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contract players. The Bosman ruling also had another key implication to the world of football. 
Before this verdict clubs could only have three foreigners in their roster. After the decision 
clubs were allowed to employ as many UE-citizens and citizens from countries with agreements 
with the EU as they pleased. However, it is important to note that citizens from nations 
unprotected by the Bosman ruling are still subject to national regulations, differing across 
countries, nonetheless, being usually more restrictive. For example, in France players from 
outside the “Bosman Area” must have at least 1 international cap to receive a work permit.  
“The challenge for economic theory is to find a dynamic balance between love and money 
necessary to analytically grasp the passionate and pragmatic complexities of the beautiful 
game” (Vrooman, 2007a). As this quote suggests, football is different from the “average” 
industries we are used to study in the business world. Workers in this market, meaning players, 
are earning millions of Euros per year and have the objective of maintaining club reputation. 
Satisfying fans is one of the top priorities of cub owners, and, in the point of view of these fans, 
winner clubs in football are the ones that win trophies not the ones that generate more revenue. 
Owners understand that, in order to win and satisfy fans, it is essential to secure the best players 
in the market, nonetheless, competition is intense. For example, global spending on transfer 
fees during the 3 months of summer of 2018 was approximately USD 5.44 billion, constituting 
a new record for the industry, with the big 5 leagues having a fundamental role spending USD 
4.21 billion. In total, until September 2018 transfer fees amounted to USD 7.10 billion, being 
11.5% more than the amount registered during the entire 2017 year (FIFA big 5 summer, 2018). 
Accordingly, it will be important to spend some time explaining how football clubs behave in 
such powerful industry so that the assumptions/expectations made are realistic. 
Football club behavior 
Rationality and Profit Maximization 
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As previously explained, the first thorough study on the economics of sports was performed by 
Simon Rottenberg in 1956 where he studied the American baseball labor market. Rottenberg 
formulated the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis where the welfare of the league depends on 
the “equal distribution of playing talent among opposing talents” (Rottenberg, 1956). No team 
can become too dominant leading to a retention of player talent which, ultimately, drives 
consumers away. The other important piece for this paper is that Rottenberg considers that club 
owners are rational profit maximizers: “A rational team will seek to maximize the rent it derives 
from each player” (Rottenberg, 1956). These two pillars combined lead us to a critical finding: 
“the relationship between revenue and number of star players turns negative at some point” 
(Anders & Christian Gulbrandsen, 2011). Accordingly, at some time, a small team will value a 
star athlete higher than a big team, concluding that, the profit maximizing solution would be a 
state where clubs are nearly equal and, therefore, the league is sustainable. However, a scenario 
in which clubs are equal across leagues is most definitely not the case today. 
Win at any cost vs. sustainability 
Another important view on the behavior of football clubs is the Sloane (1969) approach where 
teams are viewed as utility maximizers subject to solvency constraints. For Sloane it is the 
structure of clubs, meaning owners and managers, that play with the weights given to 
performance and profits. The problem associated with this power are factors causing dangerous 
non-profit maximizing behavior. For example, wealthy owners or demanding supporters can 
lead to a risky willingness to win at any cost. In these scenarios, the organization of a club is 
forced to shift their principal focus to the sporting performance and fans, maximizing the 
combination of these two elements. The key takeaway from these situations is that this type of 




The international football market seems the perfect landscape to overcome the previous 
behavioral phenomena, due to its particular conditions, however, as the author of Moneyball, 
Michael Lewis, considers: “If professional baseball players, whose achievements are endlessly 
watched, discussed and analyzed by tens of millions of people, can be radically mis-valued, 
who can’t be? If such a putatively meritocratic culture as professional baseball can be so sloppy 
and inefficient, what can’t be?”. Thus, it would be no surprise if the football market was to be 
labelled as “sloppy and inefficient” as Michael Lewis found the major league baseball to be. 
Academy players are valuable. As the European Club Association affirms “It makes sense to 
invest in youth development (because with an efficient youth academy the clubs save money 
on transfers and inflated salaries”) vis à vis to the process of bringing a new player with the 
same expected quality into the organization. Also, the player’s loyalty, identification with the 
club and the supporter’s base will grow with this bet. This suggests that if teams are profit 
maximizing on their choices when signing players, academy players ought to be a more rational 
choice than non-academy players, having the same expected quality. Teams seem to be 
overvaluing both return and capacity of non-academy players over in-house players and, 
constantly, they end up paying substantial quantities of money to secure those players instead 
of betting in their own talents. 
The main hypothesis of this paper is that it is more advantageous, in financial terms, for teams 
that want short-term results to bet on academy players rather than spending money in the labor 
market searching for athletes with the same expected quality. Consistently with the behavioral 
phenomena above presented, teams are biased towards buying players in the market, regularly 
overpaying for them. In this paper it is evaluated the change in the market value, in one season, 
of both non-academy and academy players throughout a set of different teams and countries. 
The study investigates whether academy players have a greater percentual change in their 
market value compared with the other players, evaluating if, in fact, financially, it is more 
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valuable for clubs to wager in their own players instead of buying players with the same 
projected quality. As previously mentioned, it is important to remember that when betting in 
academy players, no transfer fee is payed which immediately brings down the costs associated 
with this type of players. 
Data Explanation 
For the purpose of this paper data was collected from transfermarkt regarding player’s personal 
information and market information. Transfermarkt is a German-based website where valuable 
information on the football world is available to everyone. All kinds of data are present in this 
website, from results and transfer news to players and club’s values. Concerning personal 
information, it was gathered information on their (1) nationality, (2) age, (3) height and (4) 
dominant foot. On the market side, Transfermarkt provided information on the (5) previous 
club, (6) the actual club, (7) the country of the actual club, (8) the length of the contract, (9) the 
date of entry in the team, (10) the position, (11) whether players are from the academy or not, 
in a window of 1 (Formation1y), 2 (Formation2y) or 3 years (Formation3y), and most 
important, the difference in one season of the player’s market value, both in (12) absolute value 
and (13) percentage. The data was set up in an Excel workbook divided into leagues. Each 
league (sheet) had all this information about players, teams and countries. After that, a panel 
data was constructed in another sheet, with all league’s information in one sheet, to analyze the 
results in Stata. 
The database consists in 803 different observations from 31 different European clubs. This data 
was collected from 7 different European leagues, the Premier league (England), La Liga 
(Spain), Bundesliga (Germany), Serie A (Italy), Ligue 1 (France), Liga NOS (Portugal) and 
Eredvisie (Netherlands). It is important to state that the teams chosen in each of the national 
leagues were teams in which the average market value of players was equal or above the €10 
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Million threshold. Meaning that, clubs present in the database are top-tier European teams. To 
make this decision the assumption made was that top-tier clubs have more conditions and, 
therefore, are more likely to have and bet on academy players to their senior team. It was 
important to have rosters with academy players available so that the analysis could be 
significant and the consequent findings meaningful. 
For the development of the work a set of variables were created in order to run significant 
regressions and analyze the results. These predictors can be grouped into 2 categories: 
Independent and dependent variables. For the independent variables there is only the 
Difference variable: The percentual difference in a player’s market value in the last year. 
Regarding the dependent variables a couple of variables were built. CodeClub: A code from 1 
to 31 to list all the different clubs. CodePosition: A code from q to 4 to list the 4 football 
positions. 1) Goalkeeper, 2) Defender, 3) Midfielder and 4) Striker. Formation1y, 
Formation2y and Formation3y refer to the window of time a player has been promoted from 
the academy. Either in the previous year, 2 or 3 years ago respectively. CodeCC: (Code Club 
Country) A code from 1 to 7 to list the countries from the teams evaluated. 1) England, 2) Spain, 
3) Germany, 4) Italy, 5) France, 6) Portugal and 7) Netherlands. AgeUseful: The age of each 
player. Lastly, GroupA, GroupB, GroupC, GroupD and GroupE are variables which group 





Regarding the independent variable, Difference, the paper contains 772 observations with a 
maximum variation of 3650% and a minimum (Absolut) variation of -50%. It is important to 
refer that the most common variation is of 0% (Median). Moving on to the dependent variables, 
the CodeClub variable comprises 802 observations and the club which appears more often is 
the club 17 (Leipzig), meaning that, the German team has the most extensive roster. It is 
important to refer that the value 3, midfielders, is the most frequent position in the 
Codeposition variable (median). Regarding the Formation1y, Formation2y and 
Formation3y variables, they all have 802 observations and a median value of 0, meaning that, 
the large majority of the paper’s data are non-academy players. The median value of the 
CodeCC variable is 3, meaning that, Germany is the country with more players in the data. 
Concerning the Ageuseful variable, the paper has 802 players with a minimum age of 16 years 
and a maximum age of 41 years.  
Regression Analysis 
In order to analyze the main hypothesis of this paper a set of procedures was followed to ensure 
the significance of the findings. Interactions between variables, using the # command, were 
      GroupE          99    29.52525     1.13698         28         31
      GroupD         214     23.6028    2.320796         20         27
      GroupC         191    16.02094    1.941129         13         19
                                                                      
      GroupB         172    9.023256    2.026011          6         12
      GroupA         126    3.079365    1.434451          1          5
   Ageuseful         802    25.40399    4.522534         16         41
      CodeCC         802    3.220698    1.876305          1          7
 Formation3y         802    .1359102    .3429071          0          1
                                                                      
 Formation2y         802    .1122195    .3158332          0          1
 Formation1y         802    .0773067    .2672442          0          1
Codeposition         802    2.684539    .9888191          1          4
    CodeClub         802    16.29426    8.901777          1         31
  Difference         772    .3032746    1.738421        -.5       36.5
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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constructed to build indicators for each combination of the categories of the variables. Also, the 
i. command was used to specify indicators for each category of the variable. Lastly, fixed effects 
regressions were built to remove biased effects. The model in this paper comes out of the 
following regressions: 
Regression 1:  
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Where Xi = Formation1y, Formation2y and Formation3y 
Regression 4:  
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑦  +  𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑏 +  𝜀𝑖 
Regression 5:  
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐴 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑦𝐴  +   𝜀𝑖 
Regression 6:  
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑃 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑦𝐶𝑃  +  𝜀𝑖 
Regression 7:  
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑦𝐶  +   𝜀𝑖 
Regression 8:  
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐶𝐶 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑦𝐶𝐶  +   𝜀𝑖 
Regression 9:  
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑦𝑍𝑖  + 𝛽2𝑍𝑖   𝜀𝑖 
Where Zi = CodeClub, CodeCC, Codeposition, GroupA, GroupB, GroupC, GroupD, GroupE  
Discussion 
                                                                               
       _cons     .3151746   .1251453     2.52   0.012     .0690958    .5612533
 Formation1y     2.644907   .3984092     6.64   0.000     1.861497    3.428316
                                                                              
  Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2207.78473   374  5.90316773           Root MSE      =  2.3008
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1033
    Residual    1974.48845   373  5.29353472           R-squared     =  0.1057
       Model    233.296279     1  233.296279           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   373) =   44.07
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     375
. reg Difference Formation1y
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Before continuing it is important to refer that players promoted from the academy 4 or more 
years ago were excluded from the regressions to only compare academy players, in a window 
of 3 years, with bought players in the same span of time. As previously mentioned, for the 
purpose of this paper, academy players were divided into 3 windows so that we can see players 
that were promoted from the club academy 1, 2 or 3 years ago. Accordingly, first, to test the 
influence on the market value variation of coming from the club academy, linear regressions 
with the 3 windows were conducted. In these 3 regressions it was only compared players with 
equal windows of time in the club, meaning that, players promoted from the academy 1 year 
ago were only compared to bought players with 1 year in the team, and so on, in order to have 
results with higher level of significance. Looking at the 3 regressions, one can conclude that 
coming from the academy is statistically highly significant to a positive market value variation 
due to the p-values = 0,000 (see Annex 2 and 3). Furthermore, as expected, the coefficient of 
each independent variable (2.64 for 1 year, 1.67 for 2 years and 1.37 for 3 years) is positive but 
decreasing with the growth of the window. Meaning that, players promoted in a recent window 
of time tend to have higher variation in their market value than players promoted a few years 
ago. All results analyzed, it can be concluded that players coming from the academy have, in 
fact, a higher market value variation in one season comparing to non-academy players, 
regardless of the window of time. It is important to explain that, from now on, all regressions 
are made with promoted academy players and bought players in a window of 1 year due to the 
short period of time and the more convincing results it produces, nevertheless, regressions with 
a window of time of 2 and 3 years were also built to test the significance of the work. 
Before moving on, it would be interesting to understand how the different clubs in the data 
valuate their players, meaning that, a ranking of clubs was constructed to analyze how players, 
both from academy and outside, fluctuate their market value across the various clubs. Looking 
at Annex 4, the ranking of the clubs, it is easy to see that big clubs like Real Madrid (-0,14) or 
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Liverpool (0,092) have small positive variation or even negative variation in player’s market 
value. This is indicative that top-tier clubs, to pursue important trophies, prefer star players that 
are either experienced/mature players (have little positive or negative fluctuations in their 
market value) or young “stars” (who have reached their maximum valuation and tend to 
stabilize at that valuation). On the contrary, small teams which, usually, tend to be “exporting 
teams”, meaning that, they raise talents and send them to big international clubs tend to have 
higher positive fluctuations in their player’s valuation. Looking at Real Sociedad (1,79), Lille 
(1,41) or Valencia (0,60) these clubs do not have a club valuation so significant as top-tier clubs, 
but their players tend to have a higher value variation than star players from big European 
teams. Ultimately, this is indicative that either players here are younger athletes (with a huge 
margin of progression ahead) or are average players (who tend to have higher absolute 
variations across seasons than star players).  
To better evaluate the results of the regressions, using academy players, the use of fixed effects 
was of the utmost importance. It was assumed that certain variables could impact or bias the 
outcome variable, hence, by removing those effects it could be assessed the net effect of 
significant predictors on this outcome variable. For example, being a male or female could 
influence the opinion regarding certain matters. Therefore, by removing these effects, results 




Using a fixed effects model, the first regression made removed the age effect, meaning that, 
with this regression the model is only comparing players with the same age. This is important 
because, naturally, the variation of a promoted academy player with 22 years old is not the same 
as the variation of a promoted player with 17 years. By looking to the regression one can see 
that coming from the academy in a 1-year window (Formation1y) is highly significant to a 
positive market value variation due to a p-value = 0,000. Also, the coefficient of the 1-year 
window promotion (2,18) lead us to conclude that his variable is positively related to the 
variation of a player’s market value, implying that, when our dummy takes the value 1, the 
market value increases in average 218%. Removing the age effect, the coefficient of the 
independent variable decreases from 2,64 to 2,18 leading to significant unbiased results. 
                                                                              
         rho    .03089955   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    2.3288157
     sigma_u    .41584055
                                                                              
       _cons     .3614492   .1285268     2.81   0.005     .1086721    .6142262
 Formation1y     2.175907   .4596466     4.73   0.000     1.271908    3.079906
                                                                              
  Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.3174                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(1,352)           =     22.41
       overall = 0.1057                                        max =        42
       between = 0.8421                                        avg =      17.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.0599                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: Ageuseful                       Number of groups   =        22




After, in order to achieve impartial results, a regression fixing the position effect was 
constructed to compare players with the same position. It is critical to understand that players 
from different positions have different fluctuations in their market value (e.g. Goalkeepers tend 
to be cheaper than strikers), therefore, the results reached in this case, would be highly biased. 
Looking at the table above one can assert that leaving the academy 1 year ago or less continues 
highly significant, statistically speaking, due to the p-value of 0,000. Regarding the coefficient 
of the regressor, a value of 2,72 suggests that academy players have an increase of 272% in 
their market value compared to non-academy players with the same position. In this case, by 
fixing the position effect, the coefficient of the regressor actually increases from 2,64 to 2,72 
which represents a more accurate result.  
 
                                                                              
         rho    .03727812   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     2.275925
     sigma_u    .44785203
                                                                              
       _cons     .3072722   .1238573     2.48   0.014     .0637196    .5508248
 Formation1y     2.724998   .3961458     6.88   0.000     1.946019    3.503978
                                                                              
  Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0606                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(1,370)           =     47.32
       overall = 0.1057                                        max =       120
       between = 0.2085                                        avg =      93.8
R-sq:  within  = 0.1134                         Obs per group: min =        49
Group variable: Codeposition                    Number of groups   =         4
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       375
                                                                              
         rho     .0809949   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    2.2803174
     sigma_u     .6769634
                                                                              
       _cons     .3347724   .1256499     2.66   0.008     .0876311    .5819137
 Formation1y      2.44628   .4442882     5.51   0.000     1.572407    3.320152
                                                                              
  Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0827                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(1,343)           =     30.32
       overall = 0.1057                                        max =        18
       between = 0.3081                                        avg =      12.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.0812                         Obs per group: min =         4
Group variable: CodeClub                        Number of groups   =        31
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       375
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Intuitively, clubs are not all at the same level, neither are their academies. It follows that in 
different clubs the market value of academy players fluctuates at different degrees, therefore, 
comparing players from different clubs produces bias results. To eliminate this phenomenon, a 
regression fixing the club effect was built to compare players in the same club and reach 
unbiased results (table above). Looking at the p-value = 0,000, one can state that coming from 
the academy with a 1-year window is, statistically, highly noteworthy. Considering the 
coefficient of the regressor, inside the same club, academy players increase their value 244% 
higher than non-academy players (or players that left the academy 2 or more years ago). 
Following this line of thought, clubs from different countries follow the same pattern. It would 
be an illusion to state that teams in the Netherlands are of the same quality as teams in England. 
Hence, the variation of player’s market value clearly differs across nations. To remove this bias, 
it was constructed a regression removing the effect of the countries of the different teams 
(Annex 5). The p-value = 0,000 proposes a statistical high significance of the 1-year window 
of promotion to a positive market value variation. This regressor presents a coefficient of 2,76 
showing that academy players, promoted in the window of 1 year, alter their value 276% higher 
compared to the bought players in the previous year. 
After thoroughly evaluating the available data and consequent regressions, some important 
questions started forming. (I) What club takes the biggest advantage from academy players? 
(II) In what country do academy players have a greater market value variation? (III) In what 
position (GK, Defender, Midfielder or Striker) do academy players have an increased variation 
of their market value? (IV) Grouping the clubs into fair classes (Top, medium and low-tier), 
which of them takes higher advantage (intra-group) from academy players? 
In order to answer the first question, it was prefixed the club variable to specify indicators for 
each team of this variable, i.e., an interaction between the Formation1y and the CodeClub 
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variables was created. Meaning that, a ranking of the clubs, in terms of academy players 
valuation, was constructed to conclude which clubs took the biggest advantage from their own 
youth players (Annex 6). Looking at this regression, one can state that only 14 from the total 
31 clubs have promoted academy players in previous year (with market fluctuations available, 
this is, some players recently promoted do not have a difference in their value because they did 
not have a market value before). This just comes to show that our hypothesis, the clubs bias 
towards buying players, is a reality in the context of international football. Nevertheless, as we 
forecasted, academy players have higher variations in their value compared to other players. 
Looking at the regression, one sees that academy players, in their vast majority, have positive 
coefficients, most of them with high values. For example, Real Sociedad’s academy players (1st 
place in the ranking) have an 910% additional increase in the variation of their market value 
when comparing to players bought 1 year ago. The same happens in Ajax (2,32) or in Bayern 
Munich (2,97) leading one to firmly state that academy players are, in fact, more valuable to 
clubs financially speaking. And, it is curious to notice that, this happens in all type of clubs. 
Top, medium or low-tier international clubs take bigger financial advantage from their academy 
players than from bought players as hypothesized in the beginning of the paper. 
Regarding the difference across countries, a regression pre-fixing the country variable was 
constructed to specify values for each nation inside this variable. A ranking of countries, 
regarding the variation of academy players market value was made to achieve significant 
conclusions about academies throughout different nations and their addition to the valuation of 
players (Annex 7). Analyzing the regression, both French and Italian clubs did not promote 
academy players with a market fluctuation available, meaning that, teams inside these countries 
do not bet in in-house players as often as other clubs. Concerning the rest of the nations, Spain 
is clearly ahead with a coefficient of (5,22) followed by Germany (2,91), Netherlands (2,18), 
England (1,22) and Portugal (0,67). It is curious to see that the Netherlands has a coefficient so 
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high, being illustrative of the recent reality we have been witnessing. It is no coincidence that 
Ajax reached the Semi-Finals of the Champions league last season with a team of young talents, 
with some of them being “exported” to top international clubs this summer. 
It is also interesting to study how the player’s position impacts its market valuation. In order to 
analyze this impact a regression was constructed to see the indicators for each position inside 
this same variable (Goalkeeper, defender, midfielder and striker). First, looking at the 
regression involving every type of player (Annex 8) one can see that the ranking of positions 
in terms of variation of the market value is Defenders (0,55), Strikers (0,22), Midfielders (0,17) 
and, lastly, Goalkeepers (-0,13) which can be explained by the average age of Goalkeepers who 
tend to play more time than a typical player. Therefore, in this position players are often older 
and experience negative fluctuations with more frequency. Annex 9 shows us the regression 
using only academy players and it follows the same trend, meaning that, the ranking is exactly 
the same, but coefficients are different. Academy defenders are in front with a 619% addition 
to the variation of the market value compared to non-academy players, followed by academy 
strikers (1,90), academy midfielders (1,76) and, finally, goalkeepers (0,63) contrarily to the 
negative variation of all players. Showing that academy goalkeepers, due to their young age, 
do not experience those negative fluctuations, previously referred. 
Lastly, in order to group clubs into fair groups, teams were divided into 5 different groups. This 
groups were built having the market value of clubs into consideration. Group A consists in clubs 
which have a market value above €1 Billion (Manchester City, Liverpool, Real Madrid, 
Barcelona and PSG). Group B market values range from around €700 Million to €1 Billion. 
Group C market values varies from around €500 Million to €650 Million. Group D fluctuates 
between market values of €300M to €450M and, lastly, group E are the teams below the €300M 
threshold. The reason behind constructing these groups is to have a better insight on how clubs 
of a same level take advantage of their academies. For example, it would be unfair to compare 
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Barcelona’s academy with Lille’s academy and the results produced by each of them, meaning 
that, Barcelona produces star players more often and, when promoted, the “leap” in terms of 
valuation is significantly higher compared to young Lille players. Thus, this grouping allows to 
compare the results produced by academies and clubs of the same level and reach valuable 
findings regarding the financial advantage taken by similar clubs.  
Concerning group A, Manchester City, Liverpool and PSG did not promote academy players 
this last year (with market fluctuation available). Looking at Annex 10, one can see that Real 
Madrid takes the higher advantage from its academy with academy players adding a 232% 
variation to the non-academy players market valuation. Barcelona takes 2nd place with a 
coefficient of 0,41 meaning that academy players are also valuable to this club. It is also 
important to notice that both p-values < 5% producing significant results. 
Regarding group B (Annex 11), Tottenham, Juventus and Atletico Madrid do not have academy 
players promoted in this previous year in the database. Bayern Munich leads this group with a 
2,97 coefficient, followed by Chelsea with a coefficient of 2,16, both having p-values below 
0,05 implying statistically significant results. After, Manchester United occupies the 3rd 
position with the factor “academy” adding 17,2% to the non-academy players market value. In 
the last place is Arsenal, with the academy players accruing 5,1% to the valuation of non-
academy players. 
In group C (Annex 12) teams seem to have a significant bias against academy players. From 7 
teams only one promotes academy players. Valencia presents a -0,056 coefficient, meaning 
that, the academy factor here decreases by 5,6% the variation of non-academy players market 
valuation. Everton, Dortmund, Leipzig, Napoli, Inter and AC Milan did not promote any 
academy player with a percentual market variation in the previous year. 
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Concerning group D (Annex 13), Leicester, AS Roma, Lyon and AS Monaco are the clubs 
which did not bet in the academy this last year (did not have players with a percentual variation 
in the database). This group is led by Real Sociedad with a considerable distance to the rest. 
The factor academy accrues a 910% difference in the market value of non-academy players, 
meaning that, this club takes a massive advantage of academy players financially speaking (also 
has p-value = 0,000). In 2nd place Leverkusen presents a coefficient of 2,93 and, after, appears 
Ajax with the academy factor adding to non-academy players valuation a fluctuation of 233%. 
Benfica is the last team in this group, with a 0,74 coefficient. 
Concluding the analysis, in group E (Annex 14) only Lille did not promote academy players to 
the senior team in this previous year. Seville takes the 1st place with academy players having a 
293% increase in its valuation compared to bought players. After, PSV occupies the 2nd position 
of the group with the factor “academy” adding a 151% variation to the market value of the 
remaining players of the club. Finally, in the last position of the group is Porto with a coefficient 
of 0,55. 
Conclusion 
This paper attempted to study the context of the international football world with a special view 
on academy players and its reality. In a world where teams are biased towards buying players, 
this paper tried to discover the reason behind this status-quo. A set of behavioral and non-
behavioral phenomena were studied and, as expected, all of them worked together towards a 
reality where academy players are undervalued. Thus, taking this into consideration, the main 
hypothesis of the paper consisted in the notion that it is more advantageous for teams to bet on 
academy players rather than spending money in the labor market searching for athletes with the 
same expected quality. It was concluded that coming from the academy is highly significant to 
a positive market value variation. This result is mostly significant to teams wanting short-term 
26 
 
results due to the 1-year window variation. Using fixed-effects regressions similar results were 
obtained, however, with a higher degree of significance due to the removal of weighty bias. 
After validating the main hypothesis of the paper, a set of valuable experiments were conducted 
to reach important findings regarding the world of academy players. First, it was studied what 
club took the biggest advantage from its academy, using a rank of clubs in terms of academy 
usefulness with the 1st place going to Real Sociedad. Second, it was discovered that academy 
players in Spain have the highest variation in their market value, resorting to a ranking by 
country of the additional value of belonging to the academy. Lastly, it was revealed that the 
defender position increased most the market value of an academy player through the 
construction of a position ranking. Concluding, in order to reach superior results in terms of 
club’s academy usefulness, teams were categorized into homogeneous groups of quality and 
size and each group was studied through a club classification. 
Future Research and Limitations 
Regarding future work it would be interesting to have this paper as a starting point and study 
the academy players reality deeper. First, it would be stimulating to understand how much do 
clubs spend when forming young players. This would enable future researchers to comprehend 
if, in reality, the profit of betting in the club academy is higher than buying players with the 
same expected quality. 
 In this paper it was not analyzed the costs involved with club academies mainly because 
academies are not exclusively payed with player’s transfers and clubs look at them more like a 
source of income instead of a cost factor. After thorough research it was discovered that 
sponsors cover some academy costs and, in 75% of the cases, clubs receive financial aid from 
the National Associations softening this burden (European Club Association). Also, on the 
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other side it was not count the commissions of agents of bought players, which tend to be high 
amounts. 
 It would also be valuable to understand with what frequency are academy players promoted 
and what is the proportion of academy players that reach the senior team. For future work 
researchers should extend the window of time in the observations to evaluate the results in a 
medium to long-run perspective. This work focused on short-term findings, using a window of 
1 year, because most of the teams want results now. Lastly, it would also be interesting to scale 
up this project to other continents and understand if these leagues follow a similar trend. 
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The field of the economics of sport began to be studied with interest in 1956 with Simon 
Rottenberg’s paper on the baseball labor market which, ultimately, paved the path to the 
subsequent studies in every sports market. The key turning point of this study was Rottenberg’s 
belief that the economics of professional sports markets could actually be studied using the 
same framework as for the other existing industries. Nevertheless, he acknowledged the 
uniqueness of a sports market by the presence of two unusual aspects – the monopsony power 
(monopoly) here takes an intense form and that competitors must have similar size if any of 
them are to be successful. Recently, the availability of detailed valuable information on transfer 
fees, contract lengths and players wages along with important changes in the regulatory system 
of the football labor market have persuaded a growing number of economists to shift their 
attention to this particular industry (Bernd Frick 2007). 
Although it is not necessary to be a football specialist to follow the analysis of this thesis, for 
example, to know the difference between a central and advanced midfielder functions, it is 
important to have some basic insights on this industry. 
First players are traded for cash settlements based on their market value contrarily to the 
common draft system present in most of the American sports markets. This market value which 
goes hand in hand with the player’s salary are both in great part determined by the age and 
experience of the player, the number of international caps, number of goals scored and position 
(Bernd Frick 2007). It is also important to note that when contracts are signed between teams 
and players, no contract can exceed five years and by the terminating date players either become 
free agents or renew their contract with the team. 
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Second, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) agreed in principle in 2009 to 
establish a Financial Fair Play Regulation (FFP) to all European clubs preventing them to spend 
more than what they earn in the pursuit of success and, consequently, getting into financial 
distress that may threaten their long-term survival. UEFA engaged in this plan when in 2009 
more than half of the 655 European clubs incurred a loss in the previous year and, even if a 
small percentage managed to sustain heavy losses, at least, 20% of those clubs were in financial 
hazard. This regulation was finally implemented at the outset of the 2011-12 season providing 
UEFA with sanctions to implement against European teams that exceed spending over several 
seasons within a budgetary framework. These penalties go from fines or withholding of prize 
money to player transfer bans, being the severe of them all disqualification from European 
competitions. However, it is important to state that, contrarily to many sports in the US, UEFA 
does not impose any transfer or salary cap to the teams. Meaning that, the pursuit for 
competitive balance across national leagues and European competitions becomes a dream hard 
to become true with big teams stepping up and acquiring a big percentage of the world top 
talents.  
Third, according to FIFA regulations “Minors are deemed to be players under the age of 18, or 
between 16 and 18 for transfers within the European Union or European Economic Area” with 
the new club meeting the required minimum obligations to acquire players in this span of age 
with a non-professional contract. It is of the utmost importance to refer that only at the age of 
17 is a player eligible to sign a professional contract with a football team also subject to the 
appropriate regulation. Meaning that, an academy player will only sign a professional contract 
with the club when he turns 17 also becoming possible for him to transfer to other European 
teams with an appropriate professional contract.  
To illustrate this idea in a pragmatic way let us consider the example of Ángel Di María’s move 
to Manchester United in the summer of 2014. On 26 of August 2014 Di María signed a 5-year 
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contract with Manchester United for a transfer fee of about £60 million becoming one of the 
most expensive players at that time and the highest transfer fee paid by a British club at the 
time. When he arrived at Manchester, Di María inherited the famous Manchester United No.7 
previously worn by superstars like George Best, Cantona, Beckham and Cristiano Ronaldo. 
Needless was to say that expectations were high for the upcoming season of the Argentinian 
football star. However, expectations were not met, as the winger did not manage to settle in 
England. With only 3 goals and 10 assists in a short 27 game season, Di María was crowned by 
the British press the worst signing of the season and one of the greatest flops in the history of 
the premier league. The Argentinian player ended up leaving in the summer of 2015 to Paris 
Saint Germain for a transfer fee of around £44 million, meaning that, after just one season, 
Manchester United actually managed to lose money with the winger (accounting only for the 
transfer fees). 
Curiously, in the 2015/16 season, when Di María left for PSG, Manchester United incorporated 
from its academy into the senior team the 18 years old winger Marcus Rashford. The British 
became an over-night sensation by scoring two goals in both his debuts on the first team. First 
against Midtjylland in the UEFA Europa League, making him the youngest player ever to score 
for Man Utd in European competitions, and against Arsenal for the premier league only three 
days later. After just one remarkable season for this young player, Manchester United proposed 
a new contract to the winger keeping him at the club until 2020. After 5 great seasons with the 
British club, having 57 goals and 29 assists in 199 matches at the age of 22 Rashford continues 
to be one of the best players in the team and in the premier league justifying a market value of 
€80 million. 
Furthermore, consider the unique scenario of Chelsea’s transfer ban. FIFA punished the British 
club with a regulation forbidding them to engage in any transfer until February 2020 due to the 
breach of 150 FIFA rules involving 69 academy players. Chelsea had been claiming that several 
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academy players were only trialists and did not attend organized matches which was later 
discovered to be false. This case was detected after coming to light that the forward Bertrand 
Traore, who moved from Burkina Faso to London, played for the team for several years before 
his registration in 2014. As previously mentioned, FIFA only allows international transfers 
under-18 to happen within a certain criterion, for example, the parents move to the country in 
question for non-football reasons, to prevent children exploitation or trafficking. As the 
international organization did not tolerate these breaches a heavy transfer ban was imposed to 
the blues. Surprisingly, this punishment led to a strong bet on Chelsea academy players. 
Consider the example of the 22-year old forward Tammy Abraham, this season’s worldwide 
sensation. For the last two seasons Tammy was loaned to Swansea and Aston Villa respectively. 
This season, the blues decided to take a chance on the academy forward and, for the surprise of 
many, he has been the principal star of the team with 9 goals in the premier league and 1 in the 
Champions league. The same logical can be applied to the midfielder Mason Mount or the 
defender Fikayo Tomori. All 3 players rose to the senior team and have been under the world’s 
eyes with the transfer ban still being present in the blue’s reality. We do not know if without 
the ban these players would have been part of Chelsea’s plan or not, but one thing is certain, 








With the help of Graph 1, in the Annexes, let us consider the example of a very wealthy owner 
(e.g. a sheik) buying a small club with the desire of creating a super team capable of fighting 
for both national and international trophies. In order to do so, the sheik will see the club transfers 
falling into area 1, meaning that, the owner’s club is buying star players from big clubs. In this 
scenario, top-tier clubs, not willing to lose their position feel the need to improve their roster 
quality and compete for the best players in the market. Accordingly, transfer fees and wages 
shift upwards making transfers in the market to occur in area 2. However, low-tier clubs are 
also affected by this change pushing some of them into financial hazard. Consequently, to avoid 
financial distress the small teams start to sell players, which corresponds to the transfers 
occurring in area 4. Nevertheless, the industry still sees owners with the desire of running their 
clubs in a sustainable and self-financing way, transferring players around area 3. However, the 
strong competition forces this kind of clubs to act according the established trend, meaning that, 
sustainable clubs do not have the power to change this financially “insane” status-quo. To some 
extent, this example can be seen as representative of what the football world has been 
witnessing in the last couple of years. Just think about Manchester City, Chelsea or PSG which 
have become top-tier clubs recently due to ownership changes. The result of this ecosystem has 




















                                                                              
       _cons     .2374897   .0977039     2.43   0.015     .0455289    .4294506
 Formation2y     1.668336   .2757996     6.05   0.000     1.126467    2.210205
                                                                              
  Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2248.70369   501  4.48843053           Root MSE      =  2.0471
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0663
    Residual    2095.35919   500  4.19071838           R-squared     =  0.0682
       Model    153.344503     1  153.344503           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   500) =   36.59
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     502
. reg Difference Formation2y
                                                                              
       _cons     .2114584   .0871563     2.43   0.016     .0402716    .3826452
 Formation3y     1.372795   .2345219     5.85   0.000     .9121621    1.833427
                                                                              
  Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2262.93473   571   3.9631081           Root MSE      =  1.9352
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0550
    Residual    2134.61625   570  3.74494079           R-squared     =  0.0567
       Model    128.318478     1  128.318478           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   570) =   34.26
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     572








                                                                              
       _cons     .0503913   .3406965     0.15   0.882    -.6185083    .7192909
              
         31     -.0759221   .4824609    -0.16   0.875    -1.023152    .8713077
         30      .0724078   .4638832     0.16   0.876    -.8383479    .9831636
         29     -.0672168   .4781146    -0.14   0.888    -1.005913    .8714799
         28     -.2217994   .4666533    -0.48   0.635    -1.137994     .694395
         27      1.473654    .487262     3.02   0.003     .5169981     2.43031
         26     -.1343199    .459805    -0.29   0.770    -1.037069    .7684291
         25      .3757754   .4767722     0.79   0.431    -.5602858    1.311837
         24     -.0851739   .4818176    -0.18   0.860    -1.031141    .8607929
         23      .1636472   .4677125     0.35   0.727    -.7546268    1.081921
         22     -.0197391   .4818176    -0.04   0.967     -.965706    .9262277
         21      -.005558   .4767722    -0.01   0.991    -.9416191    .9305032
         20       .025192   .4767722     0.05   0.958    -.9108691    .9612532
         19     -.0537617   .4636292    -0.12   0.908    -.9640187    .8564953
         18      -.059461   .4819785    -0.12   0.902    -1.005744    .8868217
         17       .128801   .4677125     0.28   0.783     -.789473    1.047075
         16      .0362609   .4818176     0.08   0.940     -.909706    .9822277
         15      .0551911   .4819785     0.11   0.909    -.8910916    1.001474
         14      .0038917   .4773693     0.01   0.993    -.9333417    .9411251
         13      1.991853   .4934837     4.04   0.000     1.022982    2.960724
         12      .6489903   .4874359     1.33   0.183    -.3080071    1.605988
         11      .2410824    .506542     0.48   0.634    -.7534267    1.235591
         10     -.1390955   .4722219    -0.29   0.768    -1.066223    .7880319
          9     -.2321121   .5028327    -0.46   0.645    -1.219339    .7551144
          8      .0985287   .4720829     0.21   0.835    -.8283257    1.025383
          7      .0005702   .4677125     0.00   0.999    -.9177037    .9188442
          6     -.1228098   .4879572    -0.25   0.801    -1.080831    .8352111
          5     -.0917219   .4819785    -0.19   0.849    -1.038005    .8545608
          4     -.1046268   .4843856    -0.22   0.829    -1.055636     .846382
          3      .1278261   .4818176     0.27   0.791    -.8181407    1.073793
          2      .0917391   .4818176     0.19   0.849    -.8542277    1.037706
    CodeClub  
              
 Formation1y     2.691604   .2864194     9.40   0.000     2.129268     3.25394
                                                                              
  Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2323.97427   737  3.15328937           Root MSE      =  1.6339
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1534
    Residual    1884.81113   706  2.66970415           R-squared     =  0.1890
       Model     439.16314    31  14.1665529           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 31,   706) =    5.31
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     738
. reg Difference Formation1y i.CodeClub
F test that all u_i=0:     F(6, 367) =     1.26              Prob > F = 0.2769
                                                                              
         rho    .02257994   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    2.2960398
     sigma_u     .3489797
                                                                              
       _cons     .3041119   .1254872     2.42   0.016     .0573477     .550876
 Formation1y     2.757028   .4165164     6.62   0.000      1.93797    3.576086
                                                                              
  Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1022                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(1,367)           =     43.81
       overall = 0.1057                                        max =        81
       between = 0.1139                                        avg =      53.6
R-sq:  within  = 0.1067                         Obs per group: min =        31
Group variable: CodeCC                          Number of groups   =         7
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       375






                                                                                      
               _cons        .0666   .9799202     0.07   0.946    -1.861078    1.994278
                      
                 31     -.0085333   1.131514    -0.01   0.994    -2.234424    2.217358
                 30      .1742182   1.181828     0.15   0.883    -2.150649    2.499086
                 29      .2723231   1.153069     0.24   0.813     -1.99597    2.540616
                 28         .2586   1.200152     0.22   0.830    -2.102314    2.619514
                 27      1.824713    1.12264     1.63   0.105    -.3837203    4.033145
                 26     -.0601556    1.10769    -0.05   0.957     -2.23918    2.118869
                 25        .72115   1.166338     0.62   0.537    -1.573246    3.015546
                 24     -.0686714   1.141573    -0.06   0.952    -2.314349    2.177006
                 23      .3275667    1.10769     0.30   0.768    -1.851458    2.506592
                 22      .0804769   1.153069     0.07   0.944    -2.187816     2.34877
                 21      .0373167   1.166338     0.03   0.974    -2.257079    2.331713
                 20         .1089   1.166338     0.09   0.926    -2.185496    2.403296
                 19      .0433091   1.181828     0.04   0.971    -2.281558    2.368176
                 18     -.0007429   1.283017    -0.00   1.000    -2.524666     2.52318
                 17         .1504   1.181828     0.13   0.899    -2.174467    2.475267
                 16      .1275667   1.166338     0.11   0.913    -2.166829    2.421963
                 15      .1297333   1.222175     0.11   0.916    -2.274504     2.53397
                 14       .008275    1.12264     0.01   0.994    -2.200158    2.216708
                 13         .2959   1.249158     0.24   0.813    -2.161417    2.753217
                 12      .9893286   1.141573     0.87   0.387    -1.256349    3.235006
                 11      .4240667   1.166338     0.36   0.716    -1.870329    2.718463
                 10     -.0572364   1.181828    -0.05   0.961    -2.382104    2.267631
                  9        -.0416   1.249158    -0.03   0.973    -2.498917    2.415717
                  8      .1336222   1.222175     0.11   0.913    -2.270615    2.537859
                  7         .1154   1.181828     0.10   0.922    -2.209467    2.440267
                  6      .2156222   1.222175     0.18   0.860    -2.188615    2.619859
                  5         .1904   1.326818     0.14   0.886    -2.419689    2.800489
                  4       -.04385    1.46988    -0.03   0.976    -2.935367    2.847667
                  3         .1959    1.46988     0.13   0.894    -2.695617    3.087417
                  2      .0196857   1.283017     0.02   0.988    -2.504237    2.543609
            CodeClub  
                      
               1 31      1.513433   1.649452     0.92   0.360    -1.731333    4.758199
               1 30      2.328682    1.11206     2.09   0.037     .1410611    4.516302
               1 29      .5497436   1.403471     0.39   0.696    -2.211134    3.310622
               1 28          .739   1.200152     0.62   0.538    -1.621914    3.099914
               1 27             0  (empty)
               1 26             0  (empty)
               1 25             0  (empty)
               1 24             0  (empty)
               1 23             0  (empty)
               1 22             0  (empty)
               1 21             0  (empty)
               1 20             0  (empty)
               1 19             0  (empty)
               1 18      2.934143   2.342457     1.25   0.211    -1.673889    7.542175
               1 17             0  (empty)
               1 16             0  (empty)
               1 15      2.970667   2.309694     1.29   0.199    -1.572914    7.514248
               1 14      2.925125   1.643376     1.78   0.076    -.3076895     6.15794
               1 13      9.098667   1.183366     7.69   0.000     6.770774    11.42656
               1 12     -.0559286   2.268075    -0.02   0.980    -4.517637    4.405779
               1 11             0  (empty)
               1 10      2.323636   2.288601     1.02   0.311     -2.17845    6.825723
               1  9         .4085   1.732271     0.24   0.814    -2.999186    3.816186
               1  8             0  (empty)
               1  7             0  (empty)
               1  6      .0512778   1.712915     0.03   0.976    -3.318332    3.420888
               1  5          .172   2.366732     0.07   0.942    -4.483785    4.827785
               1  4       2.16375    1.54939     1.40   0.163    -.8841768    5.211677
               1  3             0  (empty)
               1  2             0  (empty)
               1  1             0  (empty)
Formation1y#CodeClub  
                                                                                      
          Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                      
       Total    2207.78473   374  5.90316773           Root MSE      =  2.1912
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1867
    Residual    1584.40199   330  4.80121815           R-squared     =  0.2824
       Model    623.382742    44  14.1677896           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 44,   330) =    2.95
















                                                                                    
             _cons     .1811636   .3027786     0.60   0.550    -.4142567    .7765839
                    
                7      -.045779   .5344179    -0.09   0.932    -1.096723    1.005165
                6      .1517929   .5575817     0.27   0.786    -.9447031    1.248289
                5      .4821864   .4191779     1.15   0.251    -.3421357    1.306508
                4      .0244273   .4099641     0.06   0.953    -.7817756    .8306302
                3     -.0030867   .4700637    -0.01   0.995    -.9274768    .9213033
                2      .1821987   .4058929     0.45   0.654     -.615998    .9803954
            CodeCC  
                    
              1 7      2.184615   .9078504     2.41   0.017     .3993089    3.969922
              1 6      .6654185   .9216763     0.72   0.471    -1.147077    2.477914
              1 5             0  (empty)
              1 4             0  (empty)
              1 3      2.905423   1.627988     1.78   0.075    -.2960482    6.106894
              1 2      5.217221    .702318     7.43   0.000     3.836098    6.598344
              1 1      1.224836   .9010979     1.36   0.175    -.5471912    2.996864
Formation1y#CodeCC  
                                                                                    
        Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
       Total    2207.78473   374  5.90316773           Root MSE      =  2.2455
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1459
    Residual    1830.28863   363  5.04211744           R-squared     =  0.1710
       Model    377.496101    11  34.3178273           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 11,   363) =    6.81
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     375
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1330446   .1795119    -0.74   0.459    -.4854635    .2193742
              
          4      .2180868   .2142862     1.02   0.309     -.202601    .6387747
          3      .1782844   .2115048     0.84   0.400    -.2369431    .5935119
          2      .5581866   .2070918     2.70   0.007     .1516228    .9647504
Codeposition  
              
 Formation1y     2.882977   .2726785    10.57   0.000     2.347653    3.418301
                                                                              
  Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2323.97427   737  3.15328937           Root MSE      =   1.652
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1346
    Residual    2000.31735   733   2.7289459           R-squared     =  0.1393
       Model    323.656922     4  80.9142305           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   733) =   29.65















                                                                                          
                   _cons     .0877442   .3355797     0.26   0.794    -.5721561    .7476444
                          
                      4      .0908822   .4072183     0.22   0.824    -.7098919    .8916563
                      3      .1175139   .4058108     0.29   0.772    -.6804923    .9155201
                      2      .5195711   .3952706     1.31   0.190    -.2577083    1.296851
            Codeposition  
                          
                    1 4      1.904088    .863124     2.21   0.028     .2067987    3.601377
                    1 3      1.757609   .6122864     2.87   0.004     .5535786    2.961639
                    1 2      6.189129   .7626719     8.12   0.000     4.689374    7.688884
                    1 1      .6344225   .9589987     0.66   0.509      -1.2514    2.520245
Formation1y#Codeposition  
                                                                                          
              Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
       Total    2207.78473   374  5.90316773           Root MSE      =  2.2005
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1797
    Residual    1777.15686   367  4.84238927           R-squared     =  0.1950
       Model    430.627867     7  61.5182668           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,   367) =   12.70
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     375
                                                                                    
             _cons        .0666    .082274     0.81   0.423    -.0995558    .2327558
                    
                5     -.0686714   .0958464    -0.72   0.478    -.2622371    .1248942
                4     -.0572364   .0992262    -0.58   0.567    -.2576278    .1431551
                3        -.0416   .1048792    -0.40   0.694    -.2534079    .1702079
                2      .0196857    .107722     0.18   0.856    -.1978633    .2372347
            GroupA  
                    
              1 5             0  (empty)
              1 4      2.323636   .1921508    12.09   0.000      1.93558    2.711693
              1 3         .4085   .1454413     2.81   0.008     .1147753    .7022247
              1 2             0  (empty)
              1 1             0  (empty)
Formation1y#GroupA  
                                                                                    
        Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
       Total    6.88134848    47   .14641167           Root MSE      =  .18397
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7688
    Residual     1.3876486    41  .033845088           R-squared     =  0.7983
       Model    5.49369988     6  .915616646           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,    41) =   27.05













                                                                                    
             _cons        .2625   .4400401     0.60   0.553     -.620505    1.145505
                    
               12     -.1525909   .5138561    -0.30   0.768    -1.183719    .8785368
               11     -.0661667   .5288623    -0.13   0.901    -1.127407    .9950732
               10      .2281667   .5081145     0.45   0.655    -.7914397    1.247773
                9      .0197222   .5288623     0.04   0.970    -1.041518    1.080962
                8        -.0055   .5680893    -0.01   0.992    -1.145455    1.134455
                7       -.23975   .6223106    -0.39   0.702    -1.488508    1.009008
            GroupB  
                    
             1 12             0  (empty)
             1 11      2.970667   .9276859     3.20   0.002     1.109129    4.832205
             1 10             0  (empty)
             1  9      .0512778   .6879903     0.07   0.941    -1.329276    1.431831
             1  8          .172   .9505952     0.18   0.857    -1.735509    2.079509
             1  7       2.16375   .6223106     3.48   0.001     .9149924    3.412508
             1  6             0  (empty)
Formation1y#GroupB  
                                                                                    
        Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
       Total    62.9414554    62  1.01518476           Root MSE      =  .88008
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2370
    Residual    40.2761324    52  .774541007           R-squared     =  0.3601
       Model     22.665323    10   2.2665323           Prob > F      =  0.0055
                                                       F( 10,    52) =    2.93
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      63
. 
                                                                                    
             _cons         .182   .4784994     0.38   0.705    -.7706192    1.134619
                    
               19     -.0349231   .6501527    -0.05   0.957    -1.329278    1.259431
               18     -.0780833   .6624525    -0.12   0.906    -1.396925    1.240758
               17        -.0065   .6624525    -0.01   0.992    -1.325342    1.312342
               16          .035   .6767004     0.05   0.959    -1.312207    1.382207
               15      .0121667   .6624525     0.02   0.985    -1.306675    1.331008
               14      .8739286   .6394217     1.37   0.176    -.3990623    2.146919
            GroupC  
                    
             1 19             0  (empty)
             1 18             0  (empty)
             1 17             0  (empty)
             1 16             0  (empty)
             1 15             0  (empty)
             1 14     -.0559286   1.642704    -0.03   0.973    -3.326301    3.214444
             1 13             0  (empty)
Formation1y#GroupC  
                                                                                    
        Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
       Total    206.208888    85  2.42598691           Root MSE      =   1.587
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0382
    Residual    196.449135    78  2.51857866           R-squared     =  0.0473
       Model    9.75975216     7  1.39425031           Prob > F      =  0.7910
                                                       F(  7,    78) =    0.55










                                                                                    
             _cons     .2002222   1.101806     0.18   0.856    -1.986001    2.386445
                    
               27       .040596   1.485676     0.03   0.978    -2.907307    2.988499
               26      .1249778   1.518735     0.08   0.935    -2.888523    3.138478
               25     -.1937778   1.349432    -0.14   0.886    -2.871343    2.483788
               24      .5875278   1.457553     0.40   0.688    -2.304573    3.479629
               23      .1939444   1.349432     0.14   0.886    -2.483621     2.87151
               22     -.1343651   1.665775    -0.08   0.936    -3.439624    3.170893
               21      .1622778   1.606145     0.10   0.920    -3.024663    3.349218
            GroupD  
                    
             1 27      2.328682   1.677564     1.39   0.168    -.9999688    5.657332
             1 26          .739   1.810453     0.41   0.684    -2.853331    4.331331
             1 25             0  (empty)
             1 24             0  (empty)
             1 23             0  (empty)
             1 22      2.934143   3.533642     0.83   0.408    -4.077369    9.945655
             1 21      9.098667    1.78513     5.10   0.000      5.55658    12.64075
             1 20             0  (empty)
Formation1y#GroupD  
                                                                                    
        Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
       Total    1580.85944   110  14.3714494           Root MSE      =  3.3054
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2398
    Residual    1081.65393    99  10.9257973           R-squared     =  0.3158
       Model    499.205511    11  45.3823192           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 11,    99) =    4.15
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     111
                                                                                    
             _cons      .074875   .5250349     0.14   0.887    -.9753511    1.125101
                    
               31     -.0168083   .7547852    -0.02   0.982    -1.526603    1.492987
               30      .2640481   .7841795     0.34   0.738    -1.304544    1.832641
               29      1.816437   .7425114     2.45   0.017     .3311935    3.301681
            GroupE  
                    
             1 31      1.513433   1.580928     0.96   0.342    -1.648893    4.675759
             1 30      .5497436   1.345166     0.41   0.684    -2.140989    3.240476
             1 29             0  (empty)
             1 28      2.925125   1.575105     1.86   0.068    -.2255533    6.075803
Formation1y#GroupE  
                                                                                    
        Difference        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                    
       Total    313.636745    66  4.75207189           Root MSE      =  2.1001
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0719
    Residual    264.635144    60  4.41058574           R-squared     =  0.1562
       Model    49.0016004     6  8.16693339           Prob > F      =  0.1042
                                                       F(  6,    60) =    1.85
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      67
